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The Michigan Supreme Court Diminishes the  
Right to Trail by Jury in Civil Cases 
 
 
Robert A. Sedler 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I have analyzed the right to trial by jury in civil cases as reflected 
in decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court over approximately a 20 year period dealing 
with three areas affecting the right to trial by jury in civil cases: (1) entitlement to a jury 
trial; (2) summary disposition; and (3) directed verdicts.  The study was constructed to 
cover cases over a substantial period of time, so that it would be possible to analyze 
whether the changing composition of the Michigan Supreme Court, beginning in the late 
1990's, impacted on the Court’s decisions in these three areas. 
 
 The conclusion that emerges is that the Court, as currently constituted, has 
diminished the right to trial by jury in civil cases in Michigan. The Court is more inclined 
than it was prior to 1999 to hold in more cases that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact, justifying summary disposition, and has now heard cases in which it has held that 
the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. And the fact that the Court is more inclined 
to uphold the granting of summary disposition and directed verdicts is likely to have a 
demonstrable impact on these kinds of cases when they are presented to the Court of 
Appeals and the trial courts. These courts, following the precedents of the Supreme Court 
and the results of the cases coming before that Court, will be more likely to rule in favor 
of granting motions for summary disposition and motions for directed verdicts. 
 
  Given the Court's view of the diminished role of the jury in resolving factual  
disputes in civil cases, litigating lawyers must make the best of a bad situation and do 
everything that they can in order to protect the right to trial by jury in civil cases. They 
must try to ensure in the early stages of the litigation that their cases are strong enough to 
survive a motion for summary disposition and get to the jury, and at the trial they must 
make a determined effort to present sufficient evidence to survive a directed verdict. 
Hopefully the Court's view of the diminished role of the jury will not have dealt a fatal 
blow to the right to trial by jury in civil cases in Michigan. Time will tell how well the 
lawyers of Michigan have succeeded in preserving this fundamental constitutional right. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118807
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THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT DIMINISHES THE RIGHT TO  TRIAL BY JURY IN 
CIVIL CASES 
 
by Professor Robert A. Sedler 
Wayne State University Law School 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
A number of lawyers in Michigan, who represent both plaintiffs and defendants in 
civil litigation, have expressed concerns about the right to trial by jury in Michigan. They 
have the impression that many cases are ended at the summary disposition stage. They 
also have the impression that this trend has increased in the last decade after the 
composition of the Court changed to a conservative majority. In response to this 
expression of concern, I decided to undertake a study of the right to trial by jury in civil 
cases in Michigan. I was able to obtain funding to engage a student research assistant 
to do the necessary research for this study. 
 
 
The study involved analyzing decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court over 
approximately a 20 year period dealing with three areas affecting the right to trial by jury 
in civil cases: (1) entitlement to a jury trial; (2) summary disposition; and (3) directed 
verdicts. The student research assistant, Ms. Andrea Montbriand, a third year law 
student at Wayne State University, did an outstanding job in reviewing and summarizing 
all the decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court in these three areas. At my direction, 
she collected all the cases referring to jury trial in civil cases, summary disposition, and 
directed verdicts. This extensive research ensured that we would not overlook any 
cases that could be relevant to the subject of the study. From the large number of cases 
she collected, I selected only those that directly bore on the right to trial by jury. A 
number of cases involving summary disposition were not used in the study, because 
they involved essentially questions of law that were raised and decided on a motion for 
summary disposition. The summary disposition cases that were selected for the study 
were primarily those where there was no issue as to the applicable law, so that the 
question before the Court was whether or not there was a genuine issue of material 
fact, either entitling the moving party to summary disposition or entitling the non-moving 
party to proceed to trial before a jury.1 
                                                 
1 In a few of these cases, the Court ruled that as a matter of law the plaintiff could not 
recover against the defendant, while the dissenting Justices, taking a different view of the 
applicable law,argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding the granting of 
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summary disposition. 
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The study was constructed to cover cases over a substantial period of time, so 
that it would be possible to analyze whether the changing composition of the Michigan 
Supreme Court, beginning in the late 1990's, impacted on the Court=s decisions in these 
three areas. For this reason, the cases in each of the three areas, are discussed in 
chronological order, with the earlier cases being discussed first. It may be noted in this 
regard that there were far-reaching  changes in substantive tort law during this period 
that had the effect of limiting defendants= tort liability and making it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to succeed in torts cases. As a result fewer tort cases would be brought, and of 
those that were, there would be more cases where the defendant would be entitled to 
summary disposition on the ground that there was no genuine issue of material fact as 
to the defendant=s liability. To take one example, as the Court expanded the scope of 
the open and obvious doctrine, which limits defendants= liability in premises liability 
cases,2 there would be more cases where the defendant was entitled to summary 
disposition, because there would not be a genuine issue of material fact with respect to 
the Aopen and obvious@ nature of the defect in the premises. Likewise, after the Court 
broadly interpreted the tort exemption provision of the Michigan No-Fault Act in Kreiner 
v. Fischer,3 to limit the automobile accident victim to no-fault recovery unless the victim 
could demonstrate Aserious impairment of bodily function affecting the general ability to 
lead a normal life,@  many fewer automobile accident tort cases would be brought. And 
since the Kreiner test is so strict, summary disposition would be proper in a number of 
the automobile accident cases that were brought, on the ground that the plaintiff could 
not satisfy the Ainability to lead a normal life@ test. In other words, to the extent that the 
Court, by its decisions in tort cases, and the Legislature, by the enactment of tort reform 
legislation, have significantly limited tort liability in Michigan, it follows that fewer tort 
cases will be brought, and that in those that have been brought, more will end in 
summary disposition for the defendant on the ground that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to the existence of liability. 
 
 I will review all of the cases involving these three areas affecting the right to trial 
by jury in civil cases. I will then posit some observations and conclusions from my 
review of the cases. 
 
 
 
Il. The Cases 
                                                 
2 See e.g., Riddle v. McClouth Steel Products Corp., 440 Mich 85; 485 NW2d 676 
(1992). 
3 Kreiner v. Fischer, 471 Mich 109; NW2d (2004). 
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A. Entitlement to a Jury Trial 
 
Comparatively few cases arising during the time period of the study have 
involved this issue. For the most part the issue arose in the context of the Court 
deciding whether a particular matter was a question of law for the court or a question of 
fact for the jury. 
 
In Mull v. Abbott Laboratories,4 the plaintiffs filed a products liability claim against 
a drug manufacturer. The undisputed facts showed that the three year statute of 
limitations for product liability claims had run. The plaintiff had argued that the question 
of whether the statute of limitations had run was necessarily a question for the jury, 
precluding the grant of summary disposition on this issue. The Court disagreed, holding 
that in the absence of disputed facts, the question of whether the statute of limitations 
had run is a question of law for the court. The Court emphasized that the right to trial by 
jury did not prevent the courts from deciding that there was no question of fact to be 
determined by the jury and so ruling on the issue as a matter of law.5 
 
In Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko,6 the lawyer for the losing party in a 
damages action failed to timely file his brief on appeal and failed to take other actions 
necessary to prosecute the appeal. This resulted in a malpractice action against the 
                                                 
4444 Mich 1; 506 NW2d 816 (1993). 
5 At that time, the Court had interpreted the statute of limitations as running from the 
time the plaintiff could reasonably be expected to be aware of the injury, and the dissenting 
Justices argued that the facts regarding the date that the plaintiffs were aware of their injuries 
were susceptible to various inferences, so that it was a question for the jury whether the plaintiffs 
exercised due diligence. The Michigan Supreme Court has recently abolished the discovery rule 
in statute of limitations cases, see Trentadue v. Gorton, 2007 Mich LEXIS 1622, July 25, 2007,   
  so in all cases it is now a question for the Court whether the statute of limitations has run. 
6 444 Mich 579, 313 NW2d 773 (1994). 
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lawyer in which the element of proximate cause depended on the likelihood of success 
on appeal. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Riley, held that in a legal malpractice 
action alleging negligence the question of proximate cause was a question for the court 
rather than the jury. The Court said that the right to a jury trial was not infringed when 
the court evaluated the legal merits of an appeal in a legal malpractice action, because 
determining the likely success of an appeal depended on an analysis of legal doctrine 
and procedural rules, an analysis that was beyond the competence of the jury. Justices 
Brickley and Levin dissented on the ground that there were factual questions for the jury 
to determine, such as what was the state of the law at the time of the acts in question, 
and as how the law applied to the facts of the legal malpractice claim. 
 
In the consolidated cases of Trivis v. Dreis and Krump Manufacturing Co and 
Golec v. Metal Exchange Corporation,. 7 the Court dealt with jury trial questions relating 
to the intentional tort exception to the Worker=s Disability Compensation Act. The Court, 
in an opinion by Justice Boyle, held that whether the facts alleged in the complaint were 
sufficient to constitute an intentional tort within the meaning of the Act=s exception was a 
question of law for the court, but whether the facts alleged were in fact true was a 
question for the jury.8 In contrast, in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Diehl,9 the Court dealt 
with the intentional acts exclusion from coverage under an insurance policy, where the 
act was committed by a 7 year old child. The child performed sexual acts on a younger 
child, the victim=s mother sued the insured, and the insurer claimed it had no duty to 
defend or indemnify the insured because of the intentional acts exclusion in the policy. 
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Brickley, held that it would not rule that as a 
matter of law, the exclusion applied, and that it was a question of fact for the jury 
whether the child had the intent to harm the victim. Justices Riley, Boyle and Weaver 
dissented on the ground that on the facts of this case, intent to injure should be inferred 
as a matter of law. 
 
With respect to interpretation of contracts, where the terms of the contract are 
clear, the application of the contract to the undisputed facts is a question of law for the 
Court. But where the terms of the contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of the 
contract=s ambiguous language is a question of fact to be decided by the jury on the 
basis of extrinsic evidence.10 In cases brought under the Whistleblowers Act, the right to 
                                                 
7453 Mich 149; 551 NW2d 132 (1996). 
8 In Trivis the Court held that the facts were insufficient to show intent to injure. Justices 
Levin and Cavanagh dissented in Trivis. In Golec, the Court held that the facts were sufficient to 
show intent in that the employer disregarded actual knowledge that an injury was certain to 
occur. Justices Riley, Brickley and Weaver dissented in Golec. 
9450 Mich 678; 545 N.W.2d 602 (1996). 
10 Klapp v. United Insurance Group Agency,  468 Mich. 459; 663 NW2d 447 (2003). 
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trial by jury has been specifically authorized by the legislature, so the Court did not have 
to decide whether the constitutional right to trial by jury applies to these cases.11 
 
 
11 Anzaldua v. Rudolph, 457 Mich 530; 578 NW2d 306 (1998). 
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In the most recent case involving the constitutional right to trial by jury, Phillips v. 
Mirac,Inc.,12 the Court has held that the right to trial by jury is not violated by the 
statutory imposition of caps on damages. The Court majority, in an opinion by Justice 
Taylor, reasoned that the statute only limited the consequences of the jury=s finding of 
liability and that under the statute the amount that the plaintiff receives was not within 
the purview of the jury. The dissent by Justices Cavanagh and Kelly argued that since 
the damages cap was applied automatically without regard to the jury=s assessment of 
damages, the damages cap violated the right to trial by jury. 
 
B. Summary Disposition 
 
My analysis of the cases will be divided into the periods pre-1999, and post-
1999, using 1999 as the point where the composition of the Michigan Supreme Court 
changed to a conservative majority.13 The analysis will state the Court=s holding on 
                                                 
12470 Mich 415; 685 NW2d 174 (2004). 
13 The conservative majority, as I have defined it, consists of Justices Weaver, Taylor, 
Corrigan, Young and Markman, although in recent years Justice Weaver has disassociated 
herself from that majority and in some cases has voted with Justices Cavanagh and Kelly. Justice 
Weaver was elected in 1994. Justice Taylor was appointed by Governor John Engler in 1997 and 
elected in 1998. Justice Corrigan was appointed by Governor Engler in 1999 and elected in 
2000. Justice Markman was appointed by Governor Engler in 1999 and elected in 2000. Justice 
Young was appointed by Governor Engler in 1999 and elected in 2002. The pre-1999 period for 
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whether or not there was a genuine issue of material fact in the particular case and will 
state the contrary position of any dissenting Justices. In addition to these cases, I have 
done an analysis of in lieu of leave cases involving questions of summary disposition for 
the years 2005-2007, ending in the summer of 2007. 
 
Pre-1999 
 
Velmer v. Baraga Area Schools14 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
purposes of this study begins in 1988. At that time, the Justices of the Court were as follows: 
Justice Brickley, elected in 1982; Justice Griffin, elected in 1986; Justice Riley, elected in 1982; 
Justice Levin, elected in 1972;  Justice Archer, appointed by Governor Blanchard in 1986; 
Justice Cavanagh, elected in 1982; and Justice Boyle, appointed by Governor Blanchard in 1984, 
and elected in 1988. Justice Levin was replaced by Justice Kelly, elected in 1996. Justice Archer 
was replaced by Justice Mallet, who was appointed by Governor Blanchard  in 1990, and elected 
in 1996. Justice Mallet was replaced by Justice Young. Justice Riley was replaced by Justice 
Taylor.  Justice Boyle was replaced by Justice Corrigan; Justice Brickley was replaced by Justice 
Markman. Of the Members of the current Court, only Justice Cavanagh was on the Court during 
the entire period covered by this study.     
14 430 Mich 385; 424 NW2d 770 (1988). 
A student was injured while working on a milling machine during metal shop class 
at the Baraga area schools. The school asserted governmental immunity. The plaintiff 
tried to bring the claim within the public building exception to governmental immunity. 
Deposition testimony showed that the machine was very large and had not been bolted 
or permanently affixed to the floor. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Riley, held 
that the dangerous or defective condition of a fixture, without regard to whether it is 
actually or constructively attached to the floor, could support a claim of liability under the 
public building exception to governmental immunity. The Court further held that there 
was a factual question as to whether the particular machine constituted a fixture, 
rendering summary disposition inappropriate. Justice Griffin dissented on the ground 
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that as a matter of law, the milling machine did not constitute a fixture. 
 
Bullock v. Automobile Club of Michigan 15 
 
This was an action for breach of an employment contract, in which the plaintiff 
alleged that as a consequence of the employer=s breach of express oral promises, the 
plaintiff lost a job that was guaranteed for a lifetime and in which he was told he would 
be able to earn large commissions. The employer moved for summary disposition on 
the ground that the plaintiff continued his employment after the employer changed its 
employment manual with respect to minimum production requirements and that the 
plaintiff failed to meet those requirements. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Boyle, 
held that the motion should be denied on the ground that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the effect of the change in the manuals on the plaintiff=s claim of an 
oral promise of continued employment based on the pre-existing policy. Justice Griffin 
and Chief Justice Riley dissented on the ground that the allegations of the complaint 
were insufficient as a matter of law to provide a basis for an employment contract that 
was not terminable at will. 
 
Polkow v. Citizens Insurance Co. of America16 
 
                                                 
15   432 Mich 472;444 NW2d 114 (1989). 
 
 
 
16 438 Mich 174; 476 NW2d 382 (1991). 
The insured brought an action against the insurer to determine coverage for 
groundwater contamination under a comprehensive general liability policy. The 
insurance contract contained a pollution-exclusion clause with an exception for a 
discharge was that was Asudden and accidental.@ The insurer invoked the pollution-
exclusion clause to avoid a duty to defend, and the insured argued that the discharge 
that was the basis of the suit against it was Asudden and accidental.@ There was some 
evidence in the depositions that there had been frequent spillage over the years during 
the transfer process from the tanker truck to underground tanks, so that the trier of fact 
could conclude that the insured Aexpected@ the release of the contaminants. But there 
was also some evidence in the depositions that the contaminants in issue were not from 
those oil leaks and may have been unrelated to the insured=s operations. The Court, in 
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an opinion by Chief Justice Cavanagh, held that without proof of the source of the 
discharge, it could not be determined whether the discharge fell within the pollution 
exclusion clause, or whether there was an unknown source of the discharge that 
brought the case within the Asudden and accidental@ exception to the exclusion clause. 
The Court went on to hold that this uncertainty created doubt as to coverage, rendering 
summary disposition inappropriate. Justices Riley, Mallett, and Griffin dissented on the 
ground that the undisputed facts showed that the discharge was due to the spillage, so 
that the pollution exclusion clause applied. 
 
McKart v. J. Walter Thompson USA,Inc.17 
 
In a wrongful discharge claim by a high-ranking executive of an advertising 
agency, the employer had informed the plaintiff that his position was being eliminated as 
part of a workforce reduction. The employer conceded that the plaintiff had an oral 
contract of permanent employment terminable only for cause, and contended that the 
workforce reduction constituted cause. The plaintiff contended that his discharge was 
for personal reasons, but did not introduce any evidence to this effect in opposition to 
the employer=s motion for summary disposition. This being so, the Court, in an opinion  
by Chief Justice Cavanagh, held that summary disposition was properly granted. Justice 
Levin dissented on the ground that the true reason for the plaintiff=s discharge was in 
issue and that this presented a question of fact for the jury. 
 
Trager v. Thor 18 
 
This case involved a claim of liability for a dogbite against a person in temporary 
possession of the dog. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Boyle, held that liability could 
be imposed on the basis of negligence. There was evidence that the caretaker knew 
that the dog had bitten a child prior to this incident, but there also was evidence that the 
owner put the dog in a back bedroom, thus satisfying his duty to the plaintiffs, and 
evidence that in the prior incident the dog had been provoked. The Court held that 
summary disposition on the negligence claim was improper, because the allegations 
                                                 
17   437 Mich 109; 469 NW2d 284 (1991). 
 
 
18453 Mich 149; 551 NW2d 132 (1996). 
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were sufficient to enable the trier of fact to find that the caretaker accepted responsibility 
for the care of the child while the child was in his home and had been negligent in 
allowing the child to be exposed to an animal with known dangerous propensities. 
 
Owens v. Auto Club Insurance Association19 
 
                                                 
19 444 Mich 314; 506 NW2d 850 (1993) 
In a no-fault claim involving coordinated, benefits from Veterans Administration, 
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Levin, reversed a grant of partial summary 
disposition for the claimant. The Court held that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the insured sought to obtain outpatient services from the Veterans 
Administration and whether it was necessary for him to remain at in-patient facility for 
the entire two year period. 
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Skinner v. Square D Company 20 
 
This was a products liability case brought against the manufacturer of a switch 
that the decedent had installed on his homemade tumbling machine. The decedent was 
electrocuted while using the machine. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Levin, held 
that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged defect in the 
switch could have caused the decedent=s death, so that summary disposition for the 
defendant was proper. The Court found that the  plaintiff=s evidence did not afford a 
reliable basis from which reasonable minds could infer that it was more probable than 
not that but for the defect in the switch, the decedent could have been electrocuted. 
Justice Levin dissented on this point. 
 
Bertrand v. Alan Ford,Inc. and Maurer v. Oakland County Parks and Recreation  
 Department21 
 
These consolidated cases involved the application of the open and obvious 
doctrine. In Maurer, the plaintiff alleged that as she was leaving a rest room area in a 
county park, she fell on an unmarked stone step. She further alleged that the county 
was negligent in failing to mark the step with a contrasting color, and by failing to warn 
of the additional step. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Cavanagh, held that the 
plaintiff failed to establish anything unusual about the step that would take it out from 
under the open and obvious doctrine, so that summary disposition for the county was 
proper. Justice Levin dissented on this point. In Bertrand, the plaintiff fell backwards off 
a step at the defendant=s place of business and alleged that the defendant breached its 
duty to maintain reasonably safe premises by failing to place a guardrail along the step 
or to post a sign warning of the step down. The Court held that while there was no 
genuine issue of material fact that the danger of falling was open and obvious, there 
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the construction of the step, when 
considered with the placement of the vending machines and the cashier=s window, 
along with the hinging of the door, created an unreasonable risk of harm despite the 
obviousness of the danger of falling off the step. Here, because of this awkward 
placement, the plaintiff was forced to step backwards after holding the door open for 
others, and lost her balance and fell. Justice Weaver dissented on this point. 
 
                                                 
20 445 Mich 153; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). 
21 449 Mich 606; 537 NW2d 185 (1995). 
 
 11 
Champion v. Nationwide Security22 
 
In this case an employee brought an action against the employer under the 
Michigan Civil Rights Act for quid pro quo sexual harassment, resulting in her 
constructive discharge. The basis of her claim was that she was raped by her 
supervisor after her refusal to submit to the supervisor=s sexual requests. The Court of 
Appeals granted the employer=s motion for summary disposition on the ground that the 
employer was not liable under the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding, in an 
opinion by Chief Justice Brickley, that the employer is liable for such rapes where they 
were accomplished through the use of the supervisor=s managerial powers. The Court 
also held that the employer had made sufficient admissions to establish liability under 
this rule, and so ordered the trial court render summary disposition for the plaintiff 
under  MCR 2.116(I)(2).23 Justice Boyle, joined by Justices Levin and Cavanagh, 
concurred in the ruling on the legal question, but would have remanded the case to the 
trial court with directions to make findings to determine whether, on the state of the 
record, the plaintiff was entitled to summary disposition. 
 
Sanchez v. Michigan Department of Mental Health24 
 
In this case a patient committed suicide after having been involuntarily admitted 
to a state psychiatric hospital. A claim based on negligent supervision would be barred 
by governmental immunity,  but a true building defect claim would come within the 
public building exception to governmental immunity. The claim was that the defendant 
failed to design the restroom in a manner that would allow proper supervision of 
patients. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Boyle, first held that the plaintiffs were not 
                                                 
22 450 Mich 702; 545 NW2d 596 (1996). 
23 Under this rule, if it appears to the court that the opposing party rather than the moving 
party is entitled to summary disposition, the court may render judgment in favor of the opposing 
party. 
24 455 Mich 83; 565 NW2d 358 (1997). 
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required to negate a claim of negligent supervision in order to assert their building 
defect claim. The Court then held that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to 
allege a building defect claim, so that the grant of summary disposition to the state was 
improper. Justices Riley and Weaver dissented on the ground that the allegations of the 
complaint were not sufficient to allege a building defect claim. 
 
Town v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. and McConnell v. Rollins Burdick Hunter25 
                                                 
25 455 Mich 688; 568 NW2d 64 (1997). 
 
 
These were consolidated cases involving the question of whether the plaintiffs 
presented sufficient evidence of age or sex discrimination to overcome a motion for 
summary disposition.  In Town a woman sought a transfer from her position, and was 
granted a transfer as a market administrator after she turned town a position with the 
assessment center upon learning of the center=s schedule. A year later, her supervisor 
notified her that she was being transferred to the assessment center because her 
position was being consolidated with that of another manager. The person who held the 
other position left the company. A 35 year old male assumed the consolidated position. 
The plaintiff, who was 49 years old, resigned from the company, because the 
assessment center=s schedule was incompatible with her personal situation. She 
alleged age and gender discrimination. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brickley, 
held that the employer=s motion for summary disposition should be granted on the 
ground that the employer had advanced a nondiscriminatory explanation for the 
transfer, and that the plaintiff=s evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether this nondiscriminatory explanation was a pretext for age or gender 
discrimination. In McConnnell, the plaintiff was hired when he was 55 years old, and a 
year into his employment, he was informed that he needed to improve his sales 
production. He failed to do so and was discharged. He claimed age discrimination on 
the ground that his replacement, a much younger person, was held to a different 
standard. However, his replacement was paid much less than the plaintiff and 
generated sales in an amount that was twice her smaller salary, while the plaintiff=s 
sales failed to cover his salary. In addition, the plaintiff had been hired and fired by the 
same person in a relatively short period of time. The Court again held that the plaintiff 
failed to present sufficient evidence that his age was a determining factor in the 
employer=s decision to terminate him, so that the employer was entitled to summary 
disposition. Justices Mallet, Cavanagh, and Kelly dissented in Town, saying that the 
evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the employer had discriminated against 
the plaintiff. 
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Sewell v. Southfield Public Schools26 
 
                                                 
26 456 Mich 670; 576 NW2d 153 (1998). 
           The plaintiff was injured in high school swimming class alleged that school 
maintained a dangerous and defective swimming pool, so as to come within the public 
building exception to the governmental immunity doctrine. The plaintiff alleged and 
produced supporting affidavits showing that the pool depth markers were mismarked, 
that the pool floor was uneven, that the pool depth was less than the 5 feet it was 
supposed to be, and that unlike most pools, this pool had an upslope near where a 
person might dive. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Cavanagh, held that the 
allegations and affidavit were sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to the public building exception, precluding the grant of summary disposition to 
the public school. 
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Vargo v. Sauer27 
 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brickley, held that state university=s medical 
residency program at private hospital was not a Ahospital@ within the hospital exception 
to governmental tort immunity. However, the Court then held there was a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether a medical school professor who instructed residents and 
treated private patients at the private hospital was simultaneously operating both as an 
agent of the university and of the private hospital, thereby precluding summary 
disposition in favor of professor on issue of whether he was entitled to governmental 
immunity. 
 
Lytle v. Malady28 
 
The plaintiff, who was terminated from her employment, claimed that she had a 
justification of Ajust cause@ employment and also claimed that her termination was due 
to her gender. The employer claimed that her discharge was due to a reduction in force. 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Weaver, held that summary disposition should be 
granted to the employer on both counts. On the Ajust cause@ employment claim, the 
Court noted that the language of the employer handbook stated that the contents did 
not establish any contract between employer and employee. As to the discrimination 
claim, the Court noted that the plaintiff could not show that she was treated differently 
from other employees, since the two new employees hired were not similarly situated to 
her in terms of job qualifications and functions. The Court also said that the employer 
submitted evidence of a dire economic forecast that led to the reduction in force. Justice 
Brickley, in a concurrence, took the position that the plaintiff had failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the employer had just cause to 
terminate the plaintiff as part of its reduction in force. Justices Cavanagh and Kelly 
dissented, saying that reasonable minds could differ as to the reading of the employee 
handbook and that evidence of conflict between the plaintiff and her supervisor was 
sufficient to raise a question of fact with respect to plaintiff=s claim of gender 
discrimination. Chief Justice Mallett agreed with Justices Cavanagh and Kelley with 
respect to the gender discrimination claim. 
 
Morales v. Auto-Owners Insurace Co.29 
                                                 
27 457 Mich 49; 576 NW2d 656 (1998) 
28 458 Mich 153; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). 
29 458 NW2d 288; 582 NW2d 776 (1998). 
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The no-fault auto insurer and the insured had a relationship over a six year 
period in which the insured would regularly fall behind in his payments, the insurer 
would send a notice of intent to cancel, and the insured would pay the balance owed 
before the cancellation date.  In this case, there was a dispute as to whether the policy 
had been cancelled before the insurer was involved in a serious accident. The Court, in 
an opinion by Justice Cavanagh, held that collateral estoppel applied against the insurer 
in this case, and that there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether 
the insurer complied with the policy=s notice provision and whether the insured 
reasonably relied on the reinstatement notice in not seeking other insurance. Justices 
Taylor and Weaver dissented on the ground that collateral estoppel should not be 
applied in this case. 
 
 
1999-2007 
 
Clark v. United Technologies Automotive30 
 
The defendants owned a die casting corporation and a circuit board part 
manufacturing plant. The plaintiff performed work for both businesses and was injured 
while working at the manufacturing plant when a power punch press machine 
malfunctioned. He obtained workers compensation from the die casting corporation and 
then brought a tort action against the manufacturing plant. The defendants moved for 
summary disposition on the ground that the plaintiff was employed by both companies, 
and so precluded from bring a tort action against his employer. The Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Taylor, held that whether the plaintiff was also an employee of the 
manufacturing plant  was a question of fact for the jury, precluding summary disposition 
for the employer in the tort action. The Court found that the plaintiff presented evidence 
that the two businesses were operated as two separate companies, while the 
defendants presented conflicting evidence that under the economic realities test the 
manufacturing company was a co-employer of the plaintiff. 
 
Smith v. Global Life Insurance Co.31 
 
                                                 
30 459 Mich 681; 594 NW2d 447 (1999). 
31 460 Mich 446; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). 
In a suit for breach of contract under a life insurance policy, the Court, in an 
opinion by Justice Young, held that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the 
insured had misrepresented his health in the insurance application. In the application, 
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the insured stated that he did not have a court condition, and the insurer submitted 
medical records showing that he had been diagnosed with coronary heart disease six 
years before he applied for the policy. The Court also held that it was not necessary for 
the insurer to show that it relied on the misrepresentations in issuing the policy. Justices 
Kelly and Cavanagh dissented on this point. Finally, the Court then held that private 
actions against the insurer arising out of misconduct made unlawful by the Insurance 
Code are permitted by the Michigan Consumer Protection Act. 
 
Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Machine Co.32 
 
The case involved a design defect claim against the corporate purchaser of the 
assets of the corporate manufacturer of an allegedly defective feed screw machine for 
injuries sustained while the plaintiff was using the machine. The plaintiff had settled with 
the predecessor, and the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Weaver, held that this 
settlement made the continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability inapplicable. 
With respect to summary disposition, the Court held that the plaintiff did not produce 
sufficient evidence showing a relationship between the successor corporation and the 
plaintiff=s employer or that the successor employer was actually aware of the alleged 
design defect in the type of machine owned by the plaintiff=s employer. Justices 
Brickley, Cavanagh and Kelly dissented on both issues. With respect to summary 
disposition, they pointed out  that the evidence showed that the successor corporation 
had access to the predecessor=s customer lists and that the plaintiff=s employer 
possessed a business card of the successor corporation on the premises. They 
maintained that this evidence was sufficient to raise a question as to whether the 
successor corporation had knowledge of the defect in the predecessor=s machine and 
that it had been in contact with the plaintiff=s employer about the machine in question. 
They emphasized that on a motion for summary disposition, the Court was required to 
look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The majority took the 
position that all that this evidence showed was that the successor corporation was 
soliciting business from the plaintiff=s employer, and that this showing was insufficient to 
raise a question as to the successor corporation=s knowledge of the alleged defect. 
 
Maiden v. Rozwood and Reno v. Chung33 
 
                                                 
32 460 Mich 696; 597 NW2d 506 (1999). 
33 461 Mich 109; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 
These consolidated cases involved the quantum of proof necessary to survive a 
motion for summary disposition in gross negligence actions against governmental 
employees. In Maiden, the decedent was a resident at a state mental health facility. 
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When he became physically and verbally abusive, an aide escorted him back to the 
building, where he began knocking over furniture and throwing things and attempted to 
bite the aides who were trying to restrain him. The aides held him down for 5 minutes. 
He died shortly thereafter due to positional asphyxia. The Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Corrigan, held that the plaintiff=s proofs in opposition to the defendants= motion for 
summary disposition failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the employees= 
conduct was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether 
injury would result. Justices Kelly, Cavanagh and Brickley dissented on the ground that 
the plaintiff presented evidence that the employees violated their training procedures for 
subduing a patient, knowing the possible consequences, and that this evidence was 
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to gross negligence. 
 
In Reno, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence that a medical 
examiner was grossly negligent in concluding that a dying murder victim was unable to 
speak. That conclusion contributed to the plaintiff=s being charged with the victim=s 
murder, since the plaintiff=s claim that the victim identified another person as her killer 
was disregarded. The Court held, however, that the medical examiner did not owe a 
duty to a person charged with a crime, so that the medical examiner was not 
substantively liable for the gross negligence. Justices Kelly, Brickley, and Cavanagh 
dissented on this point. 
 
Hall v. Consolidated Rail Corporation34 
 
This was a per curiam decision. In a train crossing accident, the issue was 
whether the crossing signals were working. The railroad presented uncontradicted 
evidence that the signals were working the day before the accident. The Court held that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the railroad had 
notice of the signals not working, so that the railroad was entitled to summary 
disposition. 
 
Michalski v. Bar-Levav35 
 
In an action brought under the Handicappers Civil Rights Act (HCRA), the plantiff 
claimed that she had been discharged after she informed her employer that she had 
been tentatively diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. The employer claimed that he was 
unaware of her medical condition until she left the employment. The Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Weaver, held that under HCRA, the employee must be regarded as presently 
having a physical or mental characteristic that substantially limits one or more life 
activities. The Court went on to hold that the evidence showed that the plaintiff was 
capable of performing her job duties and that there was no evidence that the employer 
                                                 
34 462 Mich 179; 679 NW2d 112 (2000) (per curiam). 
35 463 Mich 723; 625 NW2d 754 (2001). 
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regarded her as unable to perform the tasks of ordinary life. Therefore, the Court held, 
the employer was entitled to summary disposition on the plaintiff=s HCRA claim. Justices 
Kelly and Cavanagh dissented, contending that there was sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the employer discriminated 
against the plaintiff because she thought the plaintiff was handicapped, and that, if true, 
this would establish a violation of HCRA. 
 
Haliw v. City of Sterling Heights36 
 
The plaintiff claimed that she slipped and fell on a patch of ice that had formed in 
a depression on sidewalk, and tried to bring her case within the highway exception to 
governmental immunity. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Markman, held that the 
plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the claimed depression was the proximate 
cause of her fall. Thus, the reason for her fall was the accumulation of ice on the 
sidewalk, and the highway exception was inapplicable. Justices Kelly and Cavanagh 
dissented on the ground that there were genuine issues of material fact relating to 
whether the claimed depression in the sidewalk rendered the sidewalk no longer 
reasonably safe, whether the ice or snow on which the plaintiff fell was a Anatural 
accumulation,@ and whether the plaintiff=s injuries were proximately caused by the 
sidewalk=s condition 
 
Oade v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co.37 
 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Young, held that the insured=s failure to 
inform the insurer of hospitalization for chest pains between the time of application and 
the time of delivery of the policy was a Amaterial misrepresentation@ within the meaning 
of the statute permitting the insurer to avoid the policy for a Amaterial 
misrepresentation.@ This being so, the insurer was entitled to summary disposition. 
Justices Kelley and Cavanagh, dissented on the ground that a genuine issue of material 
fact existed as to whether the representations were Amaterial,@ since the plaintiff 
proffered evidence that his health did not change in any way between the date he 
applied for the insurance policy and the date it was delivered. The majority countered 
this point by contending that since there was no dispute that at a minimum, the insurer 
would have charged a higher rate had this fact been known, the misrepresentation was 
Amaterial@ within the meaning of the statute. 
 
Rose v National Auction Group,Inc.38 
 
                                                 
36 464 Mich 297; 627 NW2d 581 (2001). 
37 465 Mich 244; 632 NW2d 126 (2001). 
38 466 Mich 453; 646 NW2d 455 (2002). 
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In a negligent auctioneer claim, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Taylor, held 
that the plaintiffs= claims for breach of fiduciary duty were not supported by the 
evidence, since the plaintiffs could not have reasonably believed that it was appropriate 
to engage in a Ashill bidding@ scheme. Justices Cavanagh and Kelly dissented on the 
ground that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs could 
reasonably rely on the auctioneer to conduct the auction lawfully and as to whether the 
auctioneer enticed the plaintiffs into the Ashill bidding scheme.@ 
Klapp v. United Insurance Agency,Inc.39 
 
An insurance agent brought suit against the insurance company, claiming that 
under the employment contract, he was entitled to the vesting of a large number of his 
renewals. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Markman, held that the grant of summary 
disposition to the insurance company was improper, since there was an irreconcilable 
conflict between the vesting schedule in the contract and the definition of retirement in 
the agent=s manual. As a result, the language of the contract was ambiguous, and the 
meaning of the contract was a question of fact, to be decided by the jury. 
 
GC Timmis & Co. v. Guardian Alarm Co.40 
 
The plaintiff, a registered investment buyer, but not a licensed real estate broker, 
entered into an oral contract under which the plaintiff would receive a Asuccess fee@ for 
any company that the plaintiff contacted on the defendant=s behalf and that the 
defendant subsequently purchased. When the plaintiff claimed a Asuccess fee,@ the 
defendant contended that the plaintiff was precluded from bringing suit, because he was 
an unlicensed real estate broker. The plaintiff contended that the transaction did not 
involve real estate and so did not come within the Real Estate Brokers= Act (REBA). The 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Markman, held that summary disposition in this case was 
improper because (1) if the purchase did not involve a real estate transaction, there was 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an oral contract existed, and (2) if the 
purchase did involve a real estate transaction, there was a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the plaintiff Anegotiated@ the transaction. Justices Young and Weaver 
dissented on the ground that REBA applied to the transaction in issue, precluding the 
plaintiff=s suit for a Asuccess fee.@ 
 
Anderson v. Pine Knob Ski Resort,Inc.41 
 
A skier was injured when he lost his balance and collided with the timing shack. 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Taylor, held that recovery was barred by the 
                                                 
39 468 Mich 459; 663 NW2d 447 (2003). 
40 468 Mich 416; 662 NW2d 710 (2003). 
41 469 Mich 20; 664 NW2d 756 (2003). 
 
 20 
Michigan Ski Safety Act, which barred recovery for injury caused by a danger that was 
obvious and necessary. This being so, the ski operator was entitled to summary 
disposition. Justices, Cavanagh, Kelly and Weaver dissented on the ground that there 
was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the necessity of the timing shack 
and its location, as well as whether the placement of the timing shack near the finish 
line of the racecourse at the bottom of the hill was Aobvious and necessary@ within the 
meaning of the statute. 
West v. General Motors Corporation42 
 
In a suit under the Whistleblowers Act, the plaintiff claimed that he was 
discharged in retaliation for reporting to the police an alleged assault at the plant by a 
union committee person. The employer discharged the plaintiff on the stated ground 
that he had repeatedly violated the employer=s policies for reporting time worked. The 
Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that the plaintiff had failed to introduce any evidence 
showing a causal connection between the plaintiff=s discharge and his reporting of the 
assault incident to the police. Justices Kelly and Cavanagh dissented on the ground that 
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff actually 
misrepresented the time worked on his timesheet. In addition, they maintained that if the 
jury found that the plaintiff actually worked the time reported on the timesheet, and  that 
the discharge occurred after the report, these facts would be sufficient to support a 
claim under the Whistleblowers Act. 
 
Nastal v. Henderson & Associates Investigations,Inc.43 
 
In this case, the plaintiff, who had brought a negligence actionagainst an insured 
driver, alleged stalking by private investigators employed by the insurance company to 
conduct surveillance of the plaintiff. The surveillance continued after it had been 
discovered by the plaintiff. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Taylor, held that the 
defendant=s surveillance of the plaintiff after it had been discovered continued to serve a 
legitimate purpose within the meaning of the Private Detective License Act, so that the 
defendant was entitled to summary disposition on the plaintiff=s stalking claim. Justices 
                                                 
42 469 Mich 177; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). 
 
 
43 474 Mich 712; 691 NW2d 1 (2005). 
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Cavanagh and Kelly dissented on the ground that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the surveillance served a legitimate purpose after it was discovered, 
particularly in light of the manner in which the surveillance was conducted. 
 
Wilson v. Alpena County Road Commission44 
 
                                                 
44 474 Mich 161; 713 NW2d 717 (2006). 
In a negligence action against a county road commission, the county contended 
that it was entitled to summary disposition on the ground that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether it had notice of the claimed defect. The Court, in an 
opinion by Justice Taylor, held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create 
genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the deteriorated condition of the 
road made the road not reasonably safe for public travel and whether the road 
commission had actual or constructive notice of that fact at the time of the accident. 
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Greene v. A. P. Products,Ltd.45 
 
In this products liability action, an unattended infant died when he ingested and 
inhaled a bottle of hair oil. The bottle did not contain a warning that the product could be 
harmful if ingested and that it should be kept out of the reach of small children. The 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Corrigan, held that the manufacturer had no duty to warn 
of this danger, because it was open and obvious to a reasonably prudent person. 
Justice Cavanagh dissented on the ground that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether ingesting the product posed a risk of death in addition to a risk of 
illness. Justice Kelly dissented on the ground that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether, in the absence of any warning, the plaintiff was aware of the specific 
danger of serious harm or death. 
 
The 2007 Leave to Appeal Cases  
 
As of the summer, 2007, when this was study concluded, there were no 
summary disposition cases that were decided by the Michigan Supreme Court with 
published opinions. However, there were two cases involving questions of summary 
disposition where the Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, reversed the decisions 
of the Court of Appeals. In Lanzo Construction Co. v. Wayne Steel Erectors,46 there 
was an indemnity claim arising from an underlying injury accident. In considering the 
motion for leave to appeal, the Court found that the victim=s negligence was at least 
partially responsible for the accident, so that the indemnity plaintiff was not solely 
responsible for the accident. This being so, the Court held that the indemnity plaintiff 
was entitled to summary disposition on its claim for indemnity. In Banks v. EXXON 
Mobile Corporation,47 the plaintiff was injured at a gas station when the pump he was 
using to put gasoline in his automobile burst and sprayed gasoline in his face. The 
plaintiff sued the owner and manager of the gas station, and the Court of Appeals
granted the defendants= motion for summary disposition. The Michigan Supreme Cou
held that based on the facts presented, a reasonable jury could conclude that the 
defendants should have discovered the defect in the pump, and so reversed the grant o
summary disposition for the de
 
rt 
f 
fendant. 
                                                
 
 
45 475 Mich 502; 717 NW2d 855 (2006). 
46 477 Mich 983; 725 NW2d 454 (2007). 
47 477 Mich 983; 725 NW2d 453 (2007). 
 
 23 
A Further Note: A Two-Year Analysis of In Lieu of Leave Cases Involving 
Questions of Summary Disposition 
 
Since the plan of the study involved analyzing only reported opinions of the 
Michigan Supreme Court, the Court=s in lieu of leave decisions involving questions of 
summary disposition were not included in the study. However, after looking at the two 
decsions for 2007 discussed above, I decided to take a look at such decisions for the 
two year period from 2005-2006 to get some sense of what the Court was doing in this 
regard.  Without going into detail about the decisions,48 the research found there was 
28 such decisions in this period, which seemed to me to be a surprisingly high number. 
In 21 of the cases, the Court directed the entry of an order of summary disposition. In 5 
of them the Court held that summary disposition was improperly granted, and in 2 of 
them, the Court directed a reconsideration of the action of the Court of Appeals in 
denying the defendant=s motion for summary disposition. In the cases where the Co
ordered summary disposition, 18 of the decisions were in favor of the defendant, and 3 
were in favor of the p
urt 
laintiff. 
 
However, a number of these cases involved questions of substantive law, and so 
are not directly relevant to our analysis. As best as could be determined by the 
decisions of the Supreme Court, supplemented with looking to the unpublished 
decisions of the Court of Appeals when available, 7 of the cases involved the matter of 
whether the evidence was sufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact. In 6 of 
the cases, the Court held that the evidence was not sufficient, and reversed the decision 
of the Court of Appeal holding that the defendant=s motion for summary disposition 
should be denied. In the seventh case, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in 
granting the defendant=s motion for summary disposition. 
 
 
C. Directed Verdicts 
 
The research disclosed only 5 cases in this area, beginning in 2000. It may be 
suggested that this reflects the fact that with the changing composition of the Court, 
defendants were more inclined to file such motions and/or that motions for leave to 
appeal from decisions of the Court of Appeals involving directed verdicts were more 
likely to be granted by the Court. 
 
 Wilkinson v. Lee49    
                                                 
48 Copies of the decisions are on file with the author.. 
49 463 Mich 388; 617 NW2d 305 (2000). 
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A year and a half after an automobile accident case, the accident victim was 
diagnosed as having a meningioma brain tumor. The surgeon who removed the tumor 
testified that it was a slow growing tumor and that it was likely that the plaintiff had the 
tumor at the time of the accident. However, both he and the defendant=s medical 
witness testified that the trauma to the plaintiff=s head could have caused the tumor to 
grow or increase. The trial court denied the defendant=s motion for a directed verdict, 
and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held that the 
defendants were entitled to a directed verdict. The Supreme Court held per curiam that 
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the accident was the proximate 
cause of the injury, so that the grant of a directed verdict was improper. 
 
Hord v. Environmental Research Institute of Michigan50 
 
The plaintiff accepted a job with the defendant organization and moved to 
Michigan from New Jersey. He was laid off after one year and sued the organization, 
alleging that the organization had misrepresented its financial health and that he would 
not have accepted the position had he known the actual situation. The plaintiff=s 
evidence showed that he was given an operating summary, which he claimed he took 
as a representation of the financial status of the organization. The plaintiff also 
introduced evidence that the director knew that the organization had some financial 
problems. The trial court denied the organization=s motion for a directed verdict, and the 
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held per curiam that the 
plaintiff=s evidence was insufficient to establish fraudulent misrepresentation or silent 
fraud and ordered a directed vedict for the defendant. Justices Kelly and Cavanagh 
dissented on the ground that the jurors faced a credibility contest between the director 
and the plaintiff and could have found the facts sufficient to establish the plaintiff=s fraud 
claims. 
 
In re Estate of Karmey v, Karmey51 
 
The children of the decedent claimed that the beneficiary of the will, the 
decedent=s second wife, had exercised undue influence over the decedent when he 
made her the sole beneficiary of his estate. The probate judge ruled that the plaintiffs 
had failed to present sufficient evidence of undue influence for the jury and directed a 
verdict for the wife. The Court of Appeals applied a presumption of undue influence on 
the ground that there was a fiduciary relationship between the decedent and his wife. 
The Supreme Court held per curiam that the presumption of undue influence was not 
applicable to the marriage relationship, and upheld the grant of the directed verdict for 
the wife. 
                                                 
50 463 Mich 399; 617 NW2d 543 (2000). 
51 468 Mich 68; 658 NW2d 796 (2003). 
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Sniecinski v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan52 
 
                                                 
52 469 Mich 124; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). 
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant failed to hire her due to her pregnancy. 
The plaintiff had been employed as a telemarketing representative by a company that 
merged with the Blue Cross Network. When she became pregnant, she experienced 
problems that required her to take a medical leave for 7 months. After giving birth to a 
child, she returned to employment with the Blue Cross Network. When she became 
pregnant again, her supervisor asked her whether she would experience problems 
again and informed her that she would not be permitted to use sick time or unpaid leave 
because of her pregnancy. Plaintiff suffered a miscarriage and returned to work. At that 
point the marketing department of the Blue Cross network merged with the marketing 
department of Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan. All the Blue Cross Network 
telemarketers were required to interview for an account representative position with 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan. The plaintiff was offered the position and soon 
became pregnant again. She again had to take medical leave because of her 
pregnancy. Following a sequence of events, when the plaintiff was ready to return to 
work, the account representative position previously offered to her was not filled due to 
a hiring freeze. The Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan account representative position 
required a college degree, which the plaintiff did not have. She was offered and 
accepted a position as a marketing representative that was unrelated to her previous 
work. In her suit claiming pregnancy discrimination, the jury found for the plaintiff, and 
the trial court denied the defendant=s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Corrigan, held that the motion should have been 
granted on the ground that the plaintiff failed to show a causal link between her 
pregnancy and the defendant=s failure to hire her as an account representative. Justices 
Weaver and Kelly dissented on the ground that the evidence supported the inference 
that the defendant=s failure to hire her was causally related to her pregnancy. 
 
 
 26 
Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co,53 
 
The plaintiff brought a sexual harassment suit against her supervisor and her 
employer, contending that her supervisor engaged in sexual harassment by exposing 
himself to her while masturbating and by other conduct. The Court held that the 
supervisor was individually liable.  With respect to her claim against her employer, the 
trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the employer was entitled to a directed 
verdict, because the plaintiff did not introduce sufficient evidence showing that the 
employer had notice of the harassing conduct. The plaintiff=s evidence consisted of her 
telling two other supervisors in confidence about one incidence of the alleged conduct 
and her mentioning Aharassment@ and Ahostile environment@ in letters to the employer. 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Taylor, held that the evidence was 
insufficient and affirmed the granting of a directed judgment to the employer. Justices 
Weaver, Cavanagh and Kelly dissented on this point, contending that the evidence 
presented by the plaintiff was sufficient to raise a question of notice to the employer. 
 
 
                                                 
53 472 Mich 408; 697 NW2d 851 (2005). 
III. Observations and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the current status of the right to trial by 
jury in civil cases in Michigan. The study involved analyzing decisions of the Michigan 
Supreme Court over approximately a 20 year period dealing with three areas affecting 
the right to trial by jury in civil cases: (1) entitlement to a jury trial; (2) summary 
disposition; and (3) directed verdicts. 
 
The law respecting entitlement to a jury trial seems well-settled. Comparatively 
few cases arising during the time period of the study have involved this issue. The 
Court=s decisions in these cases establish fairly clear guidelines as to what constitutes a 
question of law for the Court and what constitutes a question of fact for the jury. In my 
opinion, these guidelines do not significantly erode the right to trial by jury in civil cases. 
 
Where there has been change the right to trial by jury in civil cases is in the area 
of summary disposition. This change has diminished the right to trial by jury in civil 
cases, because the Michigan Supreme Court ,as presently constituted, has been more 
inclined to hold that in particular cases there was no genuine issue of material fact, so 
that the moving party, usually the defendant, was entitled to summary disposition. This 
change has taken place concurrently with far-reaching changes in substantive tort law 
limiting the liability of tort defendants. Thus, there will be more tort cases in which the 
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of substantive law, and for the same 
reason, there will be a decline in the number of tort cases brought in the first place. 
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lving 
                                                
The Court=s inclination to hold in more cases that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, justifying summary disposition, as well as the Court=s making far-reaching 
changes in substantive tort law, is due in large part to the changing composition of the 
Court. Beginning in 1999, the Court changed to a conservative majority, consisting of 
Justices Weaver, Taylor, Corrigan, Young, and Markman, with Justices Cavanagh and 
Kelly as the liberal minority.54 With respect to summary disposition, our review of the 
reported cases55 shows that pre-1999, there were 17reported opinions dealing with 
summary disposition. In 7 of these cases, the Court held that summary disposition was 
proper, and in 10 of them, the Court held that it was not.56 In the period from 1999-
2006, there were 17 reported opinions dealing with summary disposition.57 In 12 of 
these cases, the Court held that summary disposition was proper, and in 5 of them, the 
Court held that it was not. In the period from 2005-2007, there were 9 cases invo
questions of summary disposition in which the Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, 
reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals. In 6 of these cases, the Court reversed 
a decision of the Court of Appeals denying a motion for summary disposition, and in 3 of 
these cases, the Court reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals granting a motion for 
summary disposition. 
 
In the area of directed verdicts, the research showed that in the period from 
2000-2005, there 5 such cases reaching the Supreme Court.58 In 4 of them, the Court 
 
54 I am using the terms Aconservative@ and Aliberal@as they are popularly understood by 
lawyers in Michigan. The Aconservative@ Justices are Republicans, four of whom were originally 
appointed to the Court by Governor Engler, and the Aliberal@ Justices are Democrats. For present 
purposes, the Aconservative@ Justices are those who are philosophically in favor of limiting tort 
liability, while the Aliberal@ Justices are those who are philosophically in favor of expanding tort 
liability. 
55 As pointed out previously, the summary disposition cases selected for the study were 
primarily those where there was no issue as to the applicable law, so that the question before the 
Court was whether or not there was a genuine issue of material fact, entitling the moving party to 
summary disposition, or entitling the non-moving party to proceed to trial before a jury. 
56 Two of the opinions involved consolidated cases, which were counted as separate cases 
for purposes of the study. In one case, the Court ordered summary disposition for the plaintiff. In 
5 of the cases where the Court held that summary disposition was improper, there was dissents 
by one or more of the Aconservative@ Justices on the Court during this period: Justices Riley, 
Griffin, Weaver and Taylor. 
57One of the opinions involved a consolidated case, which was counted as a separate case 
for purposes of the study. Justices Cavanagh and Kelly dissented in a number of the cases where 
the Court held that summary disposition was proper. 
58 The research did not disclose any directed verdict cases decided by the Michigan 
Supreme Court in published opinions prior to 2000. It may be suggested that this reflects the fact 
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held that a directed verdict should have been granted. 
 
The conclusion that emerges from the 20 year study of the reported decisions of 
the Michigan Supreme Court in the areas of summary disposition and directed verdicts 
is that the Court, as currently constituted, has diminished the right to trial by jury in civil 
cases in Michigan. The Court is more inclined than it was prior to 1999 to hold in more 
cases that there is no genuine issue of material fact, justifying summary disposition, and 
has now heard cases in which it has held that the defendant is entitled to a directed 
verdict. And the fact that the Court is more inclined to uphold the granting of summary 
disposition and directed verdicts is likely to have a demonstrable impact on these kinds 
cases when they are presented to the Court of Appeals and the trial courts. These 
courts, following the precedents of the Supreme Court and the results of the cases 
coming before that Court, will be more likely to rule in favor of granting motions for 
summary disposition and motions for directed verdicts. 
 
 
that with the changing composition of the Court, defendants were more inclined to file such 
motion and/or that decisions of the Court of Appeals involving such motions were more likely to 
be granted leave to appeal by the Supreme Court. 
However, this conclusion need some qualification. In the first place, the Court, as 
constituted prior to 1999, also held in a number of cases that summary disposition was 
proper. The difference is that the Court, as constituted after 1999, is inclined to so hold 
in a larger proportion of the cases coming before it. And in the last few years, in 
reversing decisions of the Court of Appeals in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court 
has reversed more decisions denying summary disposition than decisions granting it. 
Second, the Court, as presently constituted, is not completely one-sided. There are still 
cases, albeit fewer in number, where the Court has ruled against the granting of 
summary disposition or of a directed verdict. 
 
The Court=s decisions in the area of summary disposition send a strong message 
to litigating lawyers, the lawyers for the plaintiffs in tort cases and civil rights cases, and 
the lawyers for the defendants in contracts cases. That message is to have your facts in 
order before filing suit or before the opposing party is in a position to file a motion for 
summary disposition. My impression from reading some of the cases in the study is that 
the plaintiffs= lawyers did not plan their cases with reference to countering a motion for 
summary disposition by making sure at an early stage of the litigation that they would be 
able to prove the facts necessary to support their claim. Now that is it clear that a 
motion for summary disposition has a good chance of being granted, the time for 
proving a claim (or a defense in some contracts cases) effectively has been moved up 
from the trial stage to the pre-trial stage of the litigation. In the early stages of the 
litigation, the litigating lawyer must be sure that he or she has the evidence necessary to 
 
 29 
raise a genuine issue of material fact so as to be able to get the case to the jury. 
 
In the final analysis, in my opinion, it is clear that the Court, as currently 
constituted, has diminished the right to trial by jury in civil cases in Michigan. Given the 
Court's view of the diminished role of the jury in resolving factual disputes in civil cases, 
litigating lawyers must make the best of a bad situation and do everything that they can 
in order to protect the right to trial by jury in civil cases. They must try to ensure in the 
early stages of the litigation that their cases are strong enough to survive a motion for 
summary disposition and get to the jury, and at the trial they must make a determined 
effort to present sufficient evidence to survive a directed verdict. Hopefully the Court's 
view of the diminished role of the jury will not have dealt a fatal blow to the right to trial 
by jury in civil cases in Michigan. Time will tell how well the lawyers of Michigan have 
succeeded in preserving this fundamental constitutional right. 
 
  
